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Abstract Optimal risk-based levee designs are usually developed for economic efficiency. However, in
river systems with multiple levees, the planning and maintenance of different levees are controlled by dif-
ferent agencies or groups. For example, along many rivers, levees on opposite riverbanks constitute a sim-
ple leveed river system with each levee designed and controlled separately. Collaborative planning of the
two levees can be economically optimal for the whole system. Independent and self-interested landholders
on opposite riversides often are willing to separately determine their individual optimal levee plans, result-
ing in a less efficient leveed river system from an overall society-wide perspective (the tragedy of com-
mons). We apply game theory to simple leveed river system planning where landholders on each riverside
independently determine their optimal risk-based levee plans. Outcomes from noncooperative games are
analyzed and compared with the overall economically optimal outcome, which minimizes net flood cost
system-wide. The system-wide economically optimal solution generally transfers residual flood risk to the
lower-valued side of the river, but is often impractical without compensating for flood risk transfer to
improve outcomes for all individuals involved. Such compensation can be determined and implemented
with landholders’ agreements on collaboration to develop an economically optimal plan. By examining iter-
ative multiple-shot noncooperative games with reversible and irreversible decisions, the costs of myopia for
the future in making levee planning decisions show the significance of considering the externalities and
evolution path of dynamic water resource problems to improve decision-making.
1. Introduction
Levees can increase channel flow capacity to protect adjacent areas from potential floods, but they can fail
by overtopping and various intermediate structural failure modes [Tung and Mays, 1981a; Hui et al., 2015]. In
flood-prone river basins, individual landholders sometimes lack incentives to cooperate in planning local
levees with other landholders upstream, downstream, or across the river. Historically, noncooperation in
such conflicting situations caused economically inefficient and damaging outcomes [e.g., Kelley, 1989; Barry,
1997]. Collaboration among individual landholders can produce more system-wide economically optimal
levee systems, with less damage overall and to all landholders, but collaboration does not always occur.
Flood risk to economic activity is the likelihood of lost property and economic disruption due to flooding
times the magnitude of losses, and is measured by economic metrics as direct and indirect costs [Traver
et al., 2014]. Rare and unpredictable events could cause extreme consequences [Taleb, 2010]. Risk in flood
management is normally the probability of failure multiplied by the consequences of failure, summed over
all possible events [Hashimoto et al., 1982]. Levees can decrease but cannot eliminate the likelihood of
flooding and flood risk, given levee failures under various conditions. Risk-based optimization for levees and
leveed river systems planning has long been examined to formally include various uncertainties [Van
Dantzig, 1956; Tung and Mays, 1981a]. Optimal planning of a leveed river system minimizes the overall
expected annual costs on both riverbanks and reaches, which includes annualized construction cost and
expected (residual) annual damage cost [Hui et al., 2015].
Different river system levee plans would have different flood risk distributions. A symmetric system of levees
has two identical levees (and failure probabilities) on opposite riversides, while an asymmetric system of lev-
ees has a lower levee that is more likely to fail. Croghan [2013] discussed the economic flood risk transfor-
mation and transference among landholders, finding that total flood risk could be reduced from transferring
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risk from a high-cost urban side to a lower-valued rural side of a river. Hui [2014] theoretically and numerically
proves that an asymmetric leveed river system can increase the overall economic optimality by transferring
flood risk across the river and reducing system-wide costs. However, system-wide optimal solutions are not
necessarily acceptable for all stakeholders [Read et al., 2014]. In asymmetric leveed river systems, the required
flood risk transfer for system-wide cost optimization can increase individual costs. Therefore, compensation
might be needed for the flood risk transfer to make the solution socially stable or acceptable. Various transac-
tion costs and political barriers often prevent such compensation [Kelley, 1989; Croghan, 2013].
Game theory that examines how independent and self-interested individuals interact with each other can
help in analyzing the strategy of each landholder for leveed river system planning involving two individuals
on opposing riversides [Hui et al., 2015]. Game theory has been applied in many water conflict problems
[Carraro et al., 2005; Zara et al., 2006; Parrachino et al., 2006]. Madani [2010] has reviewed game theory
applications to water resource management. It emphasizes differences between outcomes predicted by
game theory and solutions proposed by optimization methods that inherently assume perfect cooperation
among all parties [Madani and Hooshyar, 2014]. Water engineers often easily understand cooperative game
theory, since the solutions are sometimes similar to system-wide optimization that tends to address the
conflicting goals of a system [Madani, 2010]. However, noncooperation in water conflicts is common and
tends to be more stable, with poorer literature and knowledge of application [Madani, 2010]. Individual par-
ties may not accept a socially optimal solution in practice and leave the negotiation when dissatisfied with
the solution, due to the mismatch between social-optimality and stability [Read et al., 2014]. This paper
applies noncooperative game theory to river system levee planning using risk-based optimization to ana-
lyze potential ways to guarantee a system-wide economically optimal solution and the costs of decision-
making myopia (from myopic or short-sighted view for the future) [Pinches, 1982; Madani and Hipel, 2012;
Madani and Dinar, 2012b]. Game theory could derive conditions needed to reach a system-wide economi-
cally efficient leveed river system, when decision makers on both riversides are rational. How to compensate
for flood risk transfer to incentivize cooperation can be determined by comparing results for risk-based river
system levee planning with different types of conditions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes risk-based optimization and a simple
game theory framework for a river levee system. Section 3 briefly reviews the economically optimal river
system levee planning to minimize overall expected system-wide cost cooperatively. Following sections dis-
cuss the application of different noncooperative game conditions, with no collaboration of parties involved.
Section 4 applies one-shot noncooperative game theory to the river system levee planning problem. Sec-
tion 5 then analyzes river system levee planning as an iterative multiple-shot noncooperative game where
decisions are reversible, while section 6 analyzes such a game where decisions are irreversible. Section 7 dis-
cusses the limitations of the proposed game theoretic analysis and section 8 concludes with key findings.
2. Analysis Framework
Heights of each levee on opposite riversides are the decisions in this risk-based river system levee planning
problem. Here only overflow levee failure is considered, assuming no intermediate geotechnical levee fail-
ures [Eijgenraam et al., 2014; Zhao et al., 2014; Hui, 2014]. Other levee planning related parameters are set
by standards and are identical for two river banks. Land uses behind each river bank determine the poten-
tial economic damage.
This study examines an idealized simple leveed river channel, with one levee on each opposite riverside
[Tung and Mays, 1981b]. In Figure 1, given a general trapezoid cross section, each levee is characterized
with a crown width Bc, a landside slope a, a waterside slope b, and a height H (H1 and H2 represent heights
on each riverside respectively). The leveed river system could have symmetric (or identical) opposing river-
side conditions, or have asymmetric (or different) opposing riverside conditions. For example, both river-
sides can be rural areas with the same potential damage, or rural Riverside1 with smaller potential damage
and urban Riverside2 with greater potential damage.
2.1. Risk-Based Optimization for the Whole Leveed River System
Risk-based optimization for levee planning normally minimizes the expected annual total costs (TC), which
includes expected (residual) annual damage cost (EAD) and annualized construction cost (ACC) [Van
Water Resources Research 10.1002/2015WR017707
HUI ET AL. GAME THEORY AND RISK-BASED LEVEED RIVER SYSTEM PLANNING 2
Dantzig, 1956; Samuels et al., 2008; Eijgenraam et al., 2014; Kind, 2014]. Flood risk is calculated in this way for
each landholder and the whole system, assuming the same risk aversion. Alternative approaches incorpo-
rating risk aversion are available to calculate the flood risk with probabilistic outcomes, for example, to mini-
mize the maximum risk [Wald, 1950], where further study can examine the impact of risk aversion.
Considering only overflow levee failure, flood failures of a leveed river system solely depend on the heights
of two levees. Varying relationships between the two levees are shown in Figure 1 to illustrate where flood
damages possibly occur. The system has four simple potential failure outcomes during a major flood:
1. Levee1 and Levee2 fail simultaneously, symmetric levees H15H2ð Þ (Figure 1a);
2. Levee1 or Levee2 fails with a 50% likelihood, symmetric levees H15H2ð Þ (Figure 1a);
3. Levee1 fails first if it is lower, asymmetric levees H1 < H2ð Þ (Figure 1b);
4. Levee2 fails first if it is lower, asymmetric levees H1 > H2ð Þ (Figure 1c).
The height difference between the asymmetric levees should exceed the least distinguished height (height
increment DH) that can completely transfer the flood risk to one riverside. This height increment would
change under different conditions, and needs to be assigned case by case.
For the whole leveed river system, the objective to minimize TC H1; H2ð Þ mathematically is:
Min TC H1; H2ð Þ5ACC H1; H2ð Þ1EAD H1; H2ð Þ (1)
Figure 1. Profile view of (a) symmetric levees with the same height, (b) asymmetric levees with lower Levee1, and (c) asymmetric levees
with lower Levee2.
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ACC H1; H2ð Þ5 s3V3c1LC11LC2ð Þ3 r3 11rð Þ
n
11rð Þn21
! "
(2)
EAD H1; H2ð Þ5
ð1
Qc H1; H2ð Þ
D Qð Þ3Pq Qð Þ3dQ5Di3 1-FQ Qc H1; H2ð Þð Þ½ % (3)
where r is the real (inflation-adjusted) discount rate. n is the planning lifetime of levees (years). s is a multi-
plier for administrative cost. c is the construction cost per unit volume. V5 L3
Bc3 H11H2ð Þ1 12 1tana1 1tanb
$ %
3 H211H
2
2
& 'h i
is the whole volume (trapezoidal) of two levees on the L long
river; LC15UC13A1 is cost of purchasing land on Riverside1 to build the levee, with a cost per unit area of
land UC1, and the area of land occupied by Levee1 base A15L3 Bc1 1tana1
1
tanb
$ %
3H1
h i
; LC25UC23A2, UC2,
and A25L3 Bc1 1tana1
1
tanb
$ %
3H2
h i
are corresponding parameters for Levee2. D Qð Þ is the damage costs
function depending on peak flood flow Q, assuming constant damage potential cost DP1 of Riverside1 and
DP2 of Riverside2 for any levee failure. D15DP11DP2, D25 12 DP11DP2ð Þ, D35DP1, and D45DP2 are the dam-
age costs of the four possible failure outcomes. With the above formulation, damage costs for the first fail-
ure always doubles the second failure given the same levee heights, so the inferior first failure outcome is
not further compared. Qc H1; H2ð Þ is the leveed river channel capacity, determined by the lower one
between H1 and H2. Manning’s equation is used here to convert flow with water stage. Pq Qð Þ and FQ Qð Þ
are the probability density function (PDF) and cumulative distribution function (CDF) of annual peak flood
flow Q, here we assume the annual flood frequency is lognormal distributed.
Given the risk-based optimization model for overflow levee failure only, the optimal results (basically opti-
mal levee heights H1&;H2& and optimal annual expected total costs TC& H1&;H2&ð Þ5TC1&1TC2&) can be
solved through enumeration or other search algorithms. In addition to satisfying the physical constraints,
the optimal conditions include the First-order Necessary Condition that the first-order derivative of the
objective is zero, and the Second-order Sufficient Condition that the second-order derivative should be
nonnegative for minimization.
In single levee planning cases, where the other riverside never fails and flood risk cannot be transferred, an
individually optimal height H& for a single levee corresponds to an individually minimized TC& [Hui et al.,
2015]. Figure 2 shows the cases of single levee planning for two landholders with differing potential dam-
ages. As levee height increases, each landholder’s EAD is decreasing and its ACC is increasing. Therefore,
the summed TC is first decreasing rapidly, dominated by the decreasing EAD, and then slowly increasing
with larger ACC. For two landholders with different potential damages, the annualized construction costs
are identical here for any given levee heights, while the expected annual damages differ proportionally.
Due to smaller potential damage, Landholder1’s individually minimized TC& and individually optimal H&
would be smaller than Landholder2 TC&1 < TC
&
2 and H
&
1 < H
&
2
& '
. Hc1 and H
c
2 in Figure 2 are the upper bounds
of Landholder1 and Landholder2’s possible best individual levee heights as discussed later.
2.2. A Simple Framework of Game Theory Application
Acting independently, each self-interested landholder would optimally determine the height of its own
levee using risk-based optimization instead of considering the system-wide economic costs and impacts on
others.
Game theory could analyze how the two conflicting landholders make their levee planning decisions,
according to their own interests. Each landholder is considered as an independent player who makes its
own height choice. Payoffs for possible outcomes of the game are TC for each individual landholder, includ-
ing conditional EAD and ACC, where each landholder’s EAD is based on the relative two levee heights on
opposite riversides [Hui et al., 2015].
The payoffs for Landholder1 are calculated with the function below.
TC1 H1;H2ð Þ5ACC1 H1ð Þ1EAD1 H1;H2ð Þ (4)
ACC1 H1ð Þ5 s3V13c1LC1ð Þ3 r3 11rð Þ
n
11rð Þn21
! "
(5)
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EAD1 H1;H2ð Þ5
0; if H1 > H2
0:53
Ð1
Qc H1ð Þ DP13Pq Qð Þ3dQ50:53DP13 12FQ Qc H1ð Þð Þ½ %; if H15H2Ð1
Qc H1ð Þ DP13Pq Qð Þ3dQ5DP13 12FQ Qc H1ð Þð Þ½ %; if H1 < H2
8><>: (6)
where V15 L3 Bc3H11 123
1
tana1
1
tanb
$ %
3H21
h i
is the volume of Levee1 on the L long river reach; Qc H1ð Þ is
the leveed river flow capacity, which depends on the lower H1.
The payoffs for Landholder2 are similar, with corresponding parameters.
As one landholder’s EAD (EAD1 H1;H2ð Þ or EAD2 H1;H2ð Þ) is a discontinuous function depending on relative
levee heights, the payoffs (TC1 H1;H2ð Þ or TC2 H1;H2ð Þ) are not continuous accordingly. This kind of payoffs
drives the rational decision-making and determines the outcomes for various types of games that are ana-
lyzed below.
2.3. Illustrative Cases
A numerical example illustrates application of game theory to river levee system planning for various dam-
age function and institutional conditions [USACE, 2006]. For a symmetric river channel with identical river-
side conditions, we assume both riversides are rural areas. For the asymmetric river channel system with
different riverside conditions, we assume Riverside1 is rural area and Riverside2 is urban area. The parame-
ters below affect results of the games, particularly the economic parameters, although general solution
behavior and conclusions remain the same.
The example river is the Cosumnes River in California, with a mean annual peak flow of 100m3=s. Channel
geometry and levee related parameters (Figure 1) are: channel width is 90 m including 60 m channel width
and 30 m floodplain width, channel depth is 1 m, floodplain slope is 0.01, tana51=4, tan b51=2, Bc510 m,
csoil5$30=m3, r50:05, n5100 years, s51:3, longitudinal slope of the channel and floodplain is 0:0005,
Manning’s roughness for the channel and floodplain is 0:05, and total levee length is L53000 m.
Where riverside conditions are identical, each rural riverside has a $1=m2 unit land cost and an assumed
constant $8 million damage cost if the protected area is flooded. If each levee is optimized individually and
independently (disregarding conditions on the opposite riverside), the individually optimal height is H&15H
&
2
53:1 m corresponding to an individually minimized TC&15TC
&
25$0:52 million (EAD
&
15EAD
&
25$0:16 million,
ACC&15ACC
&
25$0:36 million, and identical optimal levee failure probabilities F
&
Q15F
&
Q250:020Þ.
Figure 2. Risk-based optimization of single levee planning, for different potential damages.
Water Resources Research 10.1002/2015WR017707
HUI ET AL. GAME THEORY AND RISK-BASED LEVEED RIVER SYSTEM PLANNING 5
Where riverside conditions differ, rural Riverside1 has the same economic parameters as above, with the
same individually optimal levee planning and costs. Urban Riverside2 has a $3=m2 unit land cost and an
assumed constant $20 million damage cost if the urban area is flooded. Optimized as two single levees,
urban Riverside2 would have H&253:7 m, TC
&
25$0:69 million, EAD
&
25$0:22 million, ACC
&
25$0:47 million,
and F&Q250:011.
3. System-Wide Economically Optimal Planning
The system-wide leveed river system plan inherently assumes completely collaborative landholders for
achieving an overall economically optimal solution [Madani and Hooshyar, 2014]. A collaborative river levee
system is common when opposite riversides have the same landowners. But in case of separate ownership,
cooperation involves practical complexities.
For identical conditions on opposite riversides, the least-cost plan for the whole system is symmetric when
each levee fails with a 50% chance at the overflow height, sparing flooding at the opposite levee. Identical
height values of the symmetric levees depend on height increment DH, for example, H&s15H
&
s253 m with
DH51 m, and H&s15H
&
s252:7 m with DH50:1 m. However, if both levees would likely fail under overtop-
ping conditions (first potential failure outcome), asymmetric levees are economically optimal, despite identi-
cal riverside conditions [Hui, 2014; Croghan, 2013]. If flood damages differ, even slightly, on opposite
riversides, the overall least-cost river system levee plan should be asymmetric, with the lower-valued river-
side having a slightly lower levee. The lower-valued area then absorbs all residual flood risk by failing first
(so long as failure is only by overtopping). The least-cost river levee system plan is where the height of
urban Levee2 (H&as25H
&
as11DH) being slightly taller than that of rural Levee1 (H
&
as1), where the optimal height
for rural Levee1 H&as15H
&
s1
& '
also depends on DH. Landholder2 benefits from (residual) flood risk transfer
entirely to Landholder1 and from less construction cost than it would have with symmetric levees. And it
may be necessary to compensate for the flood risk transfer to incentivize the system-wide economically
optimal levee system plan.
Many types of economically efficient asymmetric river levee systems exist. Overflow weirs as well as other
flood relief structures that allow flood flows to escape into a basin or bypass channel can be considered as
lowered levees [Russo, 2010], transferring flood risk to the bypass channel. During a major flood, such a
transfer also can occur by breaching the levee on the lower-valued riverside or raising the levee on the
opposite riverside. Such a ‘‘levee battle’’ happened in the Mississippi floodplain as it went through signifi-
cant reclamation of flood-prone tracts during the post Civil War boom, where the established cities like
New Orleans battled the Mississippi. Due to many breaks in adjoining areas (Plaquemines Parish), rumors
gradually arose that levees were purposefully weakened to save more valuable city property on the oppo-
site riverside, since City officials worried about the safety of their own protective works [Barry, 1997]. A
worse unexpected situation appeared after the 1849 flood on the Mississippi River that broke the levee at
River Ridge, where uptown residents thought of strengthening the levee on their side, but those living on
the opposite side threatened to prevent such measures by armed force. Similar levee battles have been
fought elsewhere, including the Sacramento Valley in California [Kelley, 1989].
For the two landholders together, the overall benefit from collaboration, rather than competing, is
TCe H1e;H2eð Þ2TC& H1&;H2&ð Þ. TCe H1e;H2eð Þ5TC1e1TC2e is the overall equilibrium annual expected total cost
under the competing noncooperative situation, which sums the individual equilibrium annual expected
total cost to Landholder1 (TC1e) and Landholder2 (TC2e). TC1e and TC2e vary with different types of games
and institutional arrangements, as discussed below. And TC& H1&;H2&ð Þ is the system-wide minimum annual
expected total cost for two landholders with cooperation.
4. One-Shot Noncooperative Planning
In noncooperative games, independent and self-interested players are separately making their own deci-
sions and competing with each other [Madani and Hipel, 2012]. Typically, players would try to anticipate
each other’s decision and then select decisions to further their individual goals. Nash equilibrium, where no
one player would unilaterally deviate from one’s selected strategy considering the others’ strategies, is self-
enforcing, so Nash equilibrium is rational, but may not be economically optimal overall [Hui et al., 2015]. A
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game may have multiple pure Nash equili-
bria or none at all [Nash, 1951]. Here we only
examine the pure strategy Nash equilibrium,
where each player uses a pure strategy that
determines the move for any situation. The
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is not
examined here, where each player has a
mixed strategy profile with a probability dis-
tribution of available pure strategies, making
probabilistic decisions to unsettle other play-
ers’ decisions.
The most fundamental one-shot noncooperative game is discussed first, where the levee system planning
game is played only one time with simultaneous decision-making (an unusual case). Each player has multi-
ple discrete levee height decisions as strategies, making its decision once, simultaneously, and irrevocably.
4.1. Identical Riverside Conditions
If each landholder only has two discrete planning choices of levee height (e.g., 1 and 3 m), Figure 3 shows
the game’s normal payoff costs matrix. Each cell in the matrix contains a pair of payoffs (as costs, in this
case) for a combination of heights chosen by the two landholders. In each cell, the number on the left is
the payoff (cost) for rural Levee1 on the row, and the number on the right is the payoff for rural Levee2 on
the column. Each player’s costs would depend on the levee height chosen by the other player, leading to
changes in preferred decisions. In this example, Landholder1’s best levee height is 3 m for either of Land-
holder2’s choices, and Landholder2’s best levee height is 3 m for either of Landholder1’s choices. Thus, the
strictly dominant levee height for both landholders is 3 m, which results in one Nash equilibrium. In this
game, this equilibrium is also the system-wide economically optimal plan (having minimum total cost).
Landholders could have more discretized planning choices, for example, N55 planning choices of levee
height from 1 to 5 m with 1 m increment. With a N3N normal payoff matrix, we can find each landholder’s
best heights responding to another’s choices (best response strategy), and identify any Nash equilibria and
economically efficient outcomes.
A strategy that results in one landholder’s best payoff, given the others’ chosen strategies, is the best
response (BR) strategy of one landholder to others [Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991; Gibbons, 1992]. Given the
other landholder’s alternatives, each landholder’s best responses can be represented with a best responses
curve. The points in Figure 4 each represent a landholder’s best response strategy. These points jointly cre-
ate the best responses curve for one landholder, with 1 m (Figure 4a) and 0:1 m (Figure 4b) levee height
increments. For instance, in Figure 4a, the best response strategy of Landholder2 is a 2 m high Levee2,
given a 1 m high Levee1,
Based on Figure 4, the two identical riversides have the same best responses curves. If the levee height
choice of one landholder exceeds a critical height (critical upper levee height Hc1 or H
c
2), the other landhold-
er’s best response strategy becomes its individually optimal height (H&1 or H
&
2) and stays constant further.
Here the existence of a Nash equilibrium is affected by levee height increment (coarse or fine). A Nash equi-
librium exists when DH51 m (Figure 4a), both levee choices settle at 3 m high. No Nash equilibrium exists
in this numerical example when DH50:1 m (Figure 4b) or when DH is even smaller, since the best
responses curves cross over (no overlapping). With coarser levee height increments, where each landholder
has fewer height choices, differences between the individual payoff costs of two neighboring heights are
more likely to overlap to create a Nash equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium in this example with DH51 m is
between the maximum desired levee height (critical upper levee height Hc) and individual optimal levee
height with smaller DH50:1 m.
The best responses curves depend primarily on levee height and the resulting annualized construction cost.
At low levee heights where annualized construction cost ACC is less than one’s individual optimal annual
expected total cost TC& H&ð Þ, each player would always choose to build a levee higher than the other’s to
avoid all remaining flood risk (which is then transferred to the other landholder). According to previous
1.21, 1.21 2.34, 0.34 
0.34, 2.34 0.43, 0.43 
Rural 
Levee1 
Height  3m 
1m 
1m 3m 
Rural Levee2 Height 
Nash 
Equilibrium 
System-wide 
Economically 
Optimal 
Dominant 
Strategy 
Figure 3. Payoff costs for two identical riversides with 1 and 3 m planning
choices ($ million).
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assumptions, all residual flood risk goes to the levee with lower height (even by a single increment DH).
Therefore, as a dominant strategy, each landholder would escalate its levee DH higher than the other’s.
There is a critical upper limit of one’s best levee height Hc for each landholder (Figure 2). This critical upper
levee height Hc is where, with an additional height increment DH, the resulted annualized construction cost
ACC Hc1DHð Þ (all the flood risk is transferred to the other landholder) would exceed one’s individually mini-
mized TC& H&ð Þ. So it satisfies the condition that ACC Hcð Þ ' TC& H&ð Þ < ACC Hc1DHð Þ, with Hc > H&. The indi-
vidually optimal H& becomes one landholder’s best response strategy if it would otherwise have to exceed
the critical levee height. In this case with DH50:1 m, the individual critical levee height Hc53:9 m and indi-
vidually optimal levee height H&53:1 m are the same for the two landholders. So they stop increasing and
reduce their levee heights to H&53:1 m when they have to exceed Hc53:9 m to avoid the entire residual
risk. (In practice, the cost of raising the levees to 3.9m is irreversible, something examined later.)
4.2. Different Riverside Conditions
Figure 5 is the payoff costs matrix for each landholder having two discrete planning choices of levee height
(e.g., 1 and 3 m) for different riverside conditions. The dominant strategies and Nash equilibrium in Figure 5
are similar to those in Figure 3. The strictly dominant planning levee height is 3 m for both landholders,
leading to a Nash equilibrium that coincides with the system-wide economically efficient levee system plan.
Similarly, Figure 6 shows the best responses of each landholder given many more levee height choices,
with 1 and 0.1 m levee height increments. A Nash equilibrium (3 m high Levee1 and 4m high Levee2) exists
when DH51 m, while no Nash equilibrium exists when DH50:1 m or with smaller levee height increments
as there is no coincidence of the best response curves for the two landholders. The landholders’ best
response curves have similar trends, but the individually optimal H& and critical Hc differ for the two land-
holders. For DH50:1 m, H&153:1 m and H
c
153:9 m for rural Riverside1, and H
&
253:7 m and H
c
254:7 m for
urban Riverside2. Similarly as a dominant strategy, each landholder still builds its levee slightly higher than
the opposing riverside at low levee heights when annualized construction cost is less than TC&, until reach-
ing its Hc , and then a constant levee height response H& afterward.
In such one-shot noncooperative leveed river system planning, given a range of planning choices and pay-
offs for each choice combination, there may be no Nash equilibrium (Figures 4b and 6b). Even if a Nash
equilibrium exists, it may differ from the overall economically optimal leveed river system planning (Figure
Figure 4. Best responses (BR) of levee height choices for each landholder given the other landholder’s levee height choices, for identical riversides.
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6a). So the best choice may not be available
for a rational player making desired levee
height decisions from 0 to Hc , with a com-
mon DH50:1 m.
Such an institutional condition, with one-
shot decision-making for leveed river system
planning, while interesting, is rare, as the
entire planning process is unlikely to be
done in a short time without negotiations.
Levee planning almost always includes
extensive discussions and evaluations, fol-
lowed by construction and maintenance,
and levees can often be raised in the future, adding multiple shots in the future. One one-shot situation is
emergency response during a flood event [Lund, 2012]. In a short time, two landholders must determine
and implement their flood fighting actions, for example, sandbagging or ring levee construction as ‘‘levee
planning.’’ Acting independently, a landholder would take its best flood fighting action regardless of the
other’s decision.
5. Iterative Multiple-Shot Noncooperative Planning With Reversible Decisions
With the institutional arrangement of multiple discussions on the leveed river system planning game, we
extend the one-shot noncooperative planning to multiple shots. And first, we let the decision-making be
reversible. A multiple-shot game, also known as a ‘‘continuous game’’ [Madani and Hipel, 2012], would
include multiple opportunities for a player to choose its best alternative during the course of the game. A
player also can account for the implications of other players’ current and future actions. The number of
shots (steps) that the planning game is played here occurs when cycling or convergence occurs.
In multiple-shot leveed river system planning, noncooperative landholders could alter their individually
best levee height responses given the others’ decisions in subsequent periods [Hui et al., 2015]. Assuming
recurring leveed river system planning decisions, landholders could bargain over their levee heights multi-
ple times, until they reach converged heights or the allowed bargaining time ends. At each iteration, one or
1.21, 2.19 2.34, 0.35 
0.34, 5.74 0.43, 0.57 
Rural 
Levee1 
Height  3m 
1m 
1m 3m 
Urban Levee2 Height 
Nash 
Equilibrium 
System-wide 
Economically 
Optimal 
Dominant 
Strategy 
Figure 5. Payoff costs for two different riversides with 1 and 3 m planning
choices ($ million).
Figure 6. Best responses (BR) of levee height choices for each landholder given the other landholder’s levee height choices, for different riversides.
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both landholders would state its best levee height. Decision-making in the game can be leader follower,
where landholders make choices one by one, or simultaneous, with landholders making choices at the
same time. Each landholder decides its best individual height starting from a 0 m high levee. Initial plan-
ning decisions and initial leader(s) of the game may affect the final results. Because the results of leader fol-
lower and simultaneous games are similar in this case [Hui, 2014], only the results with simultaneous
decisions are presented here.
Where two riversides are identical, the best response of each landholder’s levee height to the other’s deci-
sion is identical in successive steps. Figure 7a presents the best responses curves of multiple-shot leveed
river system planning with reversible decisions that are made simultaneously, in 75 steps and with DH50:1 m
height increments. The best individual levee heights do not overlap, and no Nash equilibrium exists in this
game. Best individual levee heights for the two landholders are trapped following the same cycles: from
H&15H
&
253:1 m to H
c
15H
c
253:9 m (reversibility allows each levee owner to reduce construction cost by lower-
ing levee height). As landholders increase their best individual heights responding to one another in iterative
steps, one (or both) landholder’s best individual height approaches the critical upper limit of its best levee
height Hc . Once a landholder proposes a levee higher than Hc to avoid flood risk, the best response strategy is
reducing its levee height back to H& with an individually minimized TC& , where the cycle of levee escalation
repeats. This form of leveed river system planning can be interminable. Nonconvergence of the best levee
heights is because of the discontinuous individual annual expected total cost, depending on the opposing
levee decision.
With different riverside conditions, rural Riverside1 with smaller potential damage has a smaller H&1 and H
c
1.
The best individual heights in the successive steps are similar for the two landholders. Similar to Figure 7a,
Figure 7b presents the best responses curves for such a game, where the landholders’ best responses of
height decisions also get stuck in cycles. But a slight difference is that urban Landholder2 will follow rural
Landholder1’s trapped cycle, one step behind. Rural Landholder1 with smaller potential damage and
smaller Hc1, would first reduce the best individual height to H
&
153:1 m when Levee1 must exceed H
c
153:9
m to avoid the entire residual risk. Urban Landholder2 with a higher Hc2 would follow Landholder1’s cycling
decisions one step later due to the game’s structure. There is still nonconvergence and no equilibrium in
this game.
Overall, no convergence and no equilibrium exist in such iterative multiple-shot levee system planning
games where decisions of best individual heights are reversible, for identical or different riverside
Figure 7. Best response (BR) curves of levee heights and changing trends for each landholder in the multiple-shot leveed river system planning where decisions are reversible.
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conditions. The best strategy is not available for each landholder. Possible levee heights are between zero
and Hc , and more likely within the cycle region from H& to Hc .
In reality, this iterative multiple-shot planning game with reversible decisions would be highly unusual,
except for noncooperative discussions in river system levee planning (when proposed levees can be low-
ered for cost savings). For most leveed river system problems, levees are unlikely to be lowered after con-
struction. More typical situations are constructing new levees and upgrading existing levees, where
landholders have irreversible decisions that cannot recoup construction costs by lowering their levee
heights.
6. Iterative Multiple-Shot Noncooperative Planning With Irreversible Decisions
Where decisions are irreversible, a landholder in iterative multiple-shot levee system planning can only
increase or stay at the same levee height. Irreversible multiple-shot noncooperative games are observed
and studied in many areas, such as policies, environment, fishing, and ecosystem protection [Carraro and
Siniscalco, 1993; David, 1994; Sumaila, 1999; Madani and Zarezadeh, 2014]. Such irreversible iterative
multiple-shot levee system planning can easily lead to economically inefficient or even damaging out-
comes, if independent and self-interested landholders are shortsighted for the future.
In California, levees have been used to manage flooding since the mid-1800s with inefficient escalating
levee construction in the early era [Kelley, 1989; Hanak et al., 2011]. From 1867 to 1880, levee districts
located along the Sacramento River raced one another to build higher levees on each riverside [Russo,
2010]. During that period, when landholders along the Sacramento River and its tributaries could have colla-
borated on flood control projects (in theory), flood-prone landholders escalated their levees to force flood-
water onto their neighbors, since channeled floodwater would overflow or breach smaller and weaker
levees. The resulting escalation of levees in the Sacramento Valley became ineffective and economically
inefficient, and ultimately led to violence against some neighboring levees since it became less expensive
to demolish the opposing levee than to strengthen one’s own levee [Kelley, 1989].
Results and discussions below are for irreversible iterative multiple-shot river levee system planning. Still
each landholder decides its best individual heights starting from a 0 m high levee. Only simultaneous deci-
sion results are presented for illustration.
6.1. Identical Riverside Conditions
Given identical riverside conditions, Figure 8 presents results for irreversible multiple-shot leveed river sys-
tem planning with simultaneous decision-making. Levee height increments are DH50:1 m for 100 steps in
Figure 8a and DH50:05 m for 200 steps in Figure 8b. Height increments of 1 m and 0.01 m were also exam-
ined, but not plotted here as the general conclusions are similar. For identical riversides, the best individual
heights of the landholders converge at the same level (He15H
e
2) in both Figures 8a and 8b. However, the
converged heights vary with the height increment DH. Neither converged height is the system-wide opti-
mal height of 2.7 m. And for the same DH50:1 m, the converged heights in Figure 8a (4.7 m) exceeds the
maximum desired levee height (critical upper levee height 3.9 m) as shown in Figure 4b.
For each landholder given irreversible decisions with nondecreasing levee heights, the best individual levee
height is determined by the added ACC and the reduced EAD with an additional DH.
At step t when each landholder makes its move, both landholders have their best individual heights H1;t
and H2;t that transfer all residual flood risk to the opposing landholder considering the other’s previous best
individual height. So their best individual annual expected total costs only include annualized construction
costs, for example, for Landholder1:
TC1;t H1;t;H2;t21
& '
5ACC1;t H1;t
& '
(7)
At step t11, each landholder’s levee height decision can be the same as previous step t (e.g., H1;t115H1;t),
or increase to DH higher than the other’s levee at step t (e.g., H1;t115H2;t1DH). For example, for Land-
holder1, if H1;t115H1;t , the landholder would absorb all flood risk since Landholder2 is likely to increase its
levee height. Where both landholders keep at identical levee heights, they equally share the flood risk
(unless both levees would fail simultaneously). If H1;t115H2;t1DH5H1;t1DH (multiple DH increases are not
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examined here), Landholder1 could transfer all flood risk to Landholder2 with a slightly higher construction
cost. So Landholder1 would have conditional expected annual damage costs and annual expected total
costs at step t11, as in equation (8). It chooses the less costly levee height between H1;t and H1;t1DH.
TC1;t11 H1;t11;H2;t
& '
5ACC1;t11 H1;t11
& '
1EAD1;t11 H1;t11;H2;t
& '
5
ACC1;t11 H1;t
& '
1EAD1;t11 H1;t
& '
; H1;t115H1;t
ACC1;t11 H1;t1DH
& '
10; H1;t115H1;t1DH
8<: (8)
If H1;t is the converged levee height of Landholder1 (He1), H1;t115H1;t will cost less than H1;t115H1;t1DH
and Landholder1 would stay at its best individual height H1;t in all following steps. Once the increased ACC
(ACC1 H1;t1DH
& '
2ACC1 H1;t
& '
) exceeds the reduced EAD (EAD1 H1;t
& '
) for an additional DH, a landholder
would not raise the best individual height any more. So the convergence condition for H1;t is that:
EAD1 H1;t
& ' ' ACC1 H1;t1DH& '2ACC1 H1;t& ' (9)
where EAD1 H1;t
& '
5DP13 12FQ Qc H1;t
& '& ') *
and ACC1 H1;t1DH
& '
2ACC1 H1;t
& '
5 s 3 L 3 Bc 3 DH1 L23
)+
1
tana1
1
tanb
$ %
3 DH212H1;t 3 DH
& '%3 c1UC13 L 3 1tana1 1tanb$ %3 DHg3 r& 11rð Þn11rð Þn21h i.
Therefore, a smaller DH leads to larger converged best individual heights. And the converged heights could
be greater than the critical upper levee height in the one-shot noncooperative game, due to irreversible
decision-making. This can be shown mathematically by substituting the formula of EAD and ACC from equa-
tions (5) and (6) to equation (9). Theoretically, without any limitations from levee design standards, the con-
verged best individual levee heights could be infinitely large if the levee height increment DH is infinitely
small. But such a situation rarely exists for practical reasons, such as substantial fixed costs (engineering, site
preparation, etc.) for any levee work, design standards for levee height increments, financial limits, and
upper limits on levee height, particularly where DH needs to be physically defined and cannot become
infinitely small in practice.
6.2. Different Riverside Conditions
Similar to Figure 8, Figure 9 shows irreversible multiple-shot noncooperative river levee system planning for
differing riverside conditions, with simultaneous decision-making. Levee height increments are DH50:1 m
in Figure 9a, and DH50:05 m in Figure 9b. Compared to Figure 8, best individual heights of two
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Figure 8. Iterative multiple-shot leveed river system planning where decisions are irreversible, for identical riversides.
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landholders converge after similar steps in Figure 9. However, best individual height convergence differs
between the two differing landholders (He1 6¼ He2). For DH50:1 m or DH50:05 m, the best individual height
convergence of Landholder2 is greater than that of Landholder1 by one DH (He22H
e
15DH). The impacts on
the variance of best individual height convergence from levee height increments are similar to those dis-
cussed for Figure 8. In neither case do the best individual levee heights converge on the optimal set of
levee heights (H&152:7 m;H
&
252:8 or 2:75 m).
For both landholders, one’s best individual height convergence He is inferior to the individually optimal H&
that corresponds to a smaller TC&. A landholder that is nonmyopic, could avoid the cost of such decision-
making, which is the individual total cost difference between with the best individual height convergence
TCe Heð Þ and with the individually optimal height TC& H&ð Þ: TCe Heð Þ2TC& H&ð Þ. Therefore, keeping one’s
best individual height low and stop increasing at early steps could avoid much higher cost later. Nonmyopic
landholders may be willing to take such a ‘‘strategic loss’’ [Madani, 2011].
7. Discussions and Limitations
Table 1 summarizes different institutional and flood damage cases examined in this study and their major
results. Each section addresses a planning case in this table.
The system-wide economically optimal river levee plan would have the minimum overall net expected flood
damage and infrastructure costs. However, without interference (e.g., authority or compensation) to incen-
tive or force collaboration between independent landholders, economically inefficient plans are the likely
outcome under noncooperation: no Nash equilibrium of best strategy or inferior equilibrium of converged
heights. Only a nonmyopic landholder who can foresee the inferior ending results may take the ‘‘strategic
loss’’ [Madani, 2011] by choosing an individually optimal levee planning that would at least give better
results than noncooperation. The myopia causes extra costs and inefficiencies in levee system, happening
historically when rational players made decisions, such as the above mentioned levee battles in California
[Kelley, 1989]. Stable solutions differ from optimal solutions. Once a system-wide decision-maker/regulator
understands the effect of myopia on inefficient planning, it can consider designing mechanisms to create
an overlap between stability and optimality [Read et al., 2014].
A cooperative game can determine how to allocate the benefit from improving the overall cost of trans-
forming a noncooperative game into cooperative system-wide plan, where appropriate compensation or
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Figure 9. Iterative multiple-shot leveed river system planning where decisions are irreversible, for different riversides.
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authority can incentivize or force collaboration among players. Many studies discuss the core of a coopera-
tive game, where the collaborative payoffs are preferable [Nash, 1953; Aumann and Dreze, 1974; Curiel,
1997; Giglio and Wrightington, 1972]. Further studies can examine the core of this leveed river system plan-
ning game to help planning processes and institutions achieve a more economically efficient levee system.
Particularly for similar games involving multiple players, for example, a ring levee system with many sec-
tions owned separately, future studies may prove that no coalition has a value greater than the collabora-
tive payoffs and no coalition has an incentive to leave the grand coalition [Aumann and Maschler, 1961;
Madani and Dinar, 2012a].
The game theoretical analysis in this study is limited by the following major assumptions and simplifica-
tions. To apply such analysis to similar problems, these limitations should be considered and properly
addressed.
1. Potential system failure here is driven only by a levee height increment. Reality is often more compli-
cated. Two riversides may encounter different risk distributions owing to additional levee failure modes
(through-seepage, underseepage, etc.), in addition to overtopping [Wolff, 1997; Cenderelli, 2000; Foster
et al., 2000]. This would more evenly, and less predictably, distribute residual flooding risk between the
two river banks, and would likely alter game results. Additional levee failure modes should be included
in analyzing system failure, where levee structure and failure have more complete physical
representations.
2. Flood risk may be calculated differently than the expected (residual) damage cost, which determines the
payoff function for each landholder, and therefore the game results. Intuitive risk of each landholder and
the expected economic payoff function may differ; a risk-averse landholder would be less willing to take
flood risk than the expected value would indicate. Risk aversion of landholders should be considered in
flood risk estimation and in distinguishing identical or different riverside conditions.
3. Levee system planning should consider levee length effects, which is ignored in this study. Levee length
affects construction cost directly. It also affects expected flood damage cost, as a longer levee has higher
chance of failure. This is omitted from the flood risk calculation here.
4. The examined levee system planning game is static, while the game structure is potentially evolving
over a long time, owing to changes in land use and climate [Zhu et al., 2007].
5. Hydraulic and hydrologic uncertainties exist from Manning’s equation and commonly assumed station-
ary probability distribution of flood flow. Where additional information is available, these uncertainties
should be considered.
8. Conclusions
We apply noncooperative game theory to examine decision-making with risk-based analysis for simple
leveed river system planning with two independent and self-interested landholders on opposite riversides
who build their own levees, with the same or differing riverside conditions. The overall economically opti-
mal plan for the levee system minimizes annual expected total flood costs system-wide. However, economi-
cally efficient leveed river system plans are unlikely from independent and self-interested landholders on
Table 1. Planning Cases Examined and Noncooperative Game Theory Results
Number Case Identical Riversides Different Riversides
1 Independent single levee Individually optimal levee planning and costs
2 System-wide economically optimal
(cooperative) planning
Identical levees A slightly higher levee on higher-valued riverside
3 One-shot noncooperative planning No (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium
No strategy to overall optimal solution
4 Iterative multiple-shot noncooperative
planning with reversible decisions
Best responses trapped following a cycle
No strategy to overall optimal solution
5 Iterative multiple-shot noncooperative
planning with irreversible decisions
Same converged best
levee heights, but
worse than the system
optimal heights
A slightly higher converged best levee
height higher-valued riverside,
but worse than the system optimal heights
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opposite riversides optimizing best individual levee heights separately in a noncooperative setting. The
result has similarities to the general problem of managing common goods—the so-called tragedy of com-
mons [Gordon, 1954; Hardin, 1968]. The noncooperative games often do not result in a system-wide optimal
solution: a rational landholder may have no best strategy, get stuck in cycling decisions or accept inferior
best individual heights. Iterative multiple-shot games show problems of nonconvergence and no equilibria
(where decisions are reversible), and show a cost of decision-making myopia for the future (where decisions
are irreversible), in which case ‘‘strategic loss’’ might become desirable to prevent higher costs later if land-
holders are nonmyopic. Higher-level decisions and/or compensation for transferred flood risk (which intro-
duces cooperation or authority) are often needed for economically efficient levee system plans [Eijgenraam
et al., 2014].
By analyzing different types of games, from the fundamental one-shot noncooperative game to more realis-
tic multiple-shot noncooperative games with irreversible decisions, practical institutional arrangements can
be explored. With sufficient examination of games representing different institutional arrangements, a
system-wide decision-maker, funder, risk-sharing arrangement, or regulator, could determine how to lead
and organize leveed river system planning to reach better overall outcomes.
The applicability of a game theoretical framework can be increasingly limited when more assumptions
and simplifications are needed. But some general conclusions from game theoretical analysis seem
unlikely to change: noncooperation often will result in overinvestment in levee protection, overall indi-
viduals could benefit more from cooperative solutions (supported by authority or compensation), and
‘‘strategic loss’’ [Madani, 2013] can help an individual avoid some worst outcomes in noncooperation
situations.
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